Leviticus 25:9
Once every 50 years comes the great day of the Jubilee, the day when all debts are forgiven.
For this special year and for the first time, the latest cryptographic technology can be used to obtain better debt jubilees.
Hallelujah!
Leviticus 25:9
Once every 50 years comes the great day of the Jubilee, the day when all debts are forgiven.
For this special year and for the first time, the latest cryptographic technology can be used to obtain better debt jubilees.
Hallelujah!
וְעַתָּה, אִם‑תִּשָּׂא חַטָּאתָם; וְאִם‑אַיִן–מְחֵנִי נָא, מִסִּפְרְךָ אֲשֶׁר כָּתָבְתָּ
Exodus 32:31
Erecting false idols leads to the fall: you don’t build an enduring house over pseudo-anonymity, inefficient Sybil-resistance, insecure scripts, and unstable policies. And what is worse, with entry limited to only a very limited few.
Instead, when you build a great house, you invite everyone to enjoy it.
Rembrandt — Moses Breaking the Tablets of the Law
לֹא, תִּגְנֹבוּ; וְלֹא‑תְכַחֲשׁוּ וְלֹא‑תְשַׁקְּרוּ, אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ
Lev. 19:11
As the human mind is inscrutable to others, so its elucubrations are the truly purest form of property. Raziel protects your secrets from the Adversary and provides proofs against its malicious machinations: you shall not be robbed neither of your data nor of your code, for they are your inalienable property.
Hallelujah!
One of the most important protocol switchovers was carried off 30 years ago: the ARPANET stopped using NCP (Network Control Protocol) to only use TCP/IP, as the righteous Jon Postel devised in The General Plan. NCP was a fully connection-oriented protocol more like the X.25 suite, designed to ensure reliability on a hop by hop basis. The switches in the middle of the network did have to keep track of packets, unlike the connectionless TCP/IP were error correction and flow control is handled at the edges of the network. That is, intelligence turned to the border of the network and packets of the same connection could be passed between separated networks with different configurations. Arguably, the release of an open-source protocol stack implementation under a permissive license (4.2BSD) was a key component of its success: code is always a better description than any protocol specification.
Yet TCP/IP was still incomplete: after the 1983 switchover, many computers started connecting to ARPANET, and bottlenecks due to congestion were common. Van Jacobson devised the Tahoe and Reno congestion-avoidance algorithm to lower data transfers and stop flooding the network with packets: it was quickly implemented on the TCP/IP stacks of the day, saving the Net to this day.
These changes were necessary, as they allowed the Internet to grow, on a global scale. Another set of changes as profound as those were, are now being discussed in the Secure Interdomain Routing mailing list: this time the culprit is the insecurity of BGP, as route announcements are not authenticated, and the penance is enforcing a PKI into the currently distributed, decentralized and autonomous Internet routing system. Technical architectures force a predetermined model of control and governance, and this departure from the previously agreed customs and conventions of the Internet may simply be a bridge too far away, as always, in the name of security. And the current proposals may even impact Internet’s scalability, since the size of the required Resource Public Key Infrastructure may be too large for routers to handle, as the following paper from Verisign shows:
On the other hand, this recent analysis shows that the design of the security of SBGP is of very high quality, a rare thing in the networking field, indeed:
The first electronic and programmable computer, Colossus, was created to break the Lorenz cipher as implemented by Enigma machines. Since then, the exponential growth in the computational performance of integrated circuits has given rise to a cryptographic arms race in which safer encryption methods are conceived to protect information from the most recent and powerful crypto-analytic attacks. This competition with no end in sight was the key behind the development of cryptography as an academic discipline in the 70’s, a key turning point that left behind methods that resemblings those of pre-scientific periods: the dawn of the classical epoch of cryptography saw the invention of the well-known algorithms Diffie-Hellman-Merkle and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, now fundamental for electronic commerce in the Internet era.
But in the last decade, the greater emphasis on models, formalization and the building of provable secure protocols transformed the discipline in a transcendental way: however, many of these results are yet to be implemented. Next, some of the most interesting constructions, that only appear on the academic literature and are not yet published in textbooks:
Propagating a mass media scare-mongering on the latest piece of malware is always a very good resource to fill those blank pages of newspapers.
These days, it’s the turn of TDSS, yet another so-so malware that endures due to the lusers’ blatant incompetence. This so-called indestructible botnet features:
I wonder when malware will catch-up with the already published research from the crypto-virology field. It would be wonderful to see a massive botnet, if you understand me, using advanced techniques such as questionable encryption, kleptography or homomorphic encryption applied to delegated computation. Then, we would be talking about a really indestructible botnet.